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Introduction
The Republic of Korea’s economy has been one of
the economic marvels  of  the last  few decades,
growing  rapidly  and  steadily,  with  few
downturns.  By 2010, the ROK had the world’s
12th largest GDP, and ranked 10th among nations
in electricity consumption and production, 10th in
gas imports, 9th in oil consumption, and 4th in oil
imports.2  The ROK has become an international
force  in  several  industries,  including  steel,
automobiles ,  and  electronics ,  and  has
experienced  a  large  increase  in  the  living
s tandards  o f  i t s  people ,  as  wel l  as  in
urbanization.  Much of the ROK’s energy needs
are  supplied  by  imports,  and  the  ROK  has
embraced  nuclear  power  as  a  key  source  of
electricity.
The last decade has seen some transitions in the
ROK  energy  sector,  including  a  partial
restructuring of the electricity sector, expanded
investment in oil and gas producer nations, and a
drive to export nuclear technologies. In August
2008, President Lee Myung-bak announced “low
carbon  green  growth”  as  a  “new  national
development  paradigm”  in  his  speech  on  the
60th anniversary of national independence.  The
years  since  that  announcement  have  seen  the
development,  and  the  very  early  phases  of
implementation,  of  green  growth  principles  in
South  Korea,  and  of  policies  related  to  the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper explores the energy sector and energy
security  policies  in  the  ROK,  describes  the
genesis and current status of green growth and
GHG  emissions  reduction  policies  and
projections, reviews the strengths and weakness
of existing green economy policies, and suggests
how green economy and energy security policies
in the ROK can be developed and carried out.
Overview of the energy and economic situation
in the ROK
As of  the  end of  the  Korean  War,  the  ROK’s
economy and infrastructure, to the extent that it
had  survived  the  ravages  of  the  conflict,  was
largely agricultural, with most energy provided
by biomass (wood and crop wastes) and from the
ROK’s modest reserves of anthracite coal.  The
country’s rapid industrialization, particularly in
the last  30 years,  has been fueled largely with
imported  energy,  such  that  as  of  now only  a
small  percent  of  energy  is  supplied  from
domest ic  sources ,  and  much  of  that  is
combustion of municipal and other wastes.  By
2010,  domestic  coal  constituted only  about  1.8
percent of total ROK coal use, and much less than
one per cent of total energy use.3   
Figure  1  shows  trends  in  ROK GDP,  primary
energy use (that is, including inputs to processes
such as electricity generation and oil  refining),
and  f inal  energy  use  (use  of  energy  by
consumers).  Both GDP and primary energy use
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have increased approximately 5-fold since 1980,
with strong growth throughout the period except
during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.    As
implied in Figure 1 and shown more clearly in
Figure 2, the trend in intensity of energy use, that
is, the use of energy per unit of ROK GDP, has
shown  two  distinct  trends:  increasing  (more
energy use per unit GDP) until about 1997, then
slowly  decreasing,  through  2007,  due  to  a
combination of greater efficiency of energy use
and  a  slow  shift  to  less  energy-intensive
industries.   Although  growth  in  energy
consumption exceeded growth in GDP in every
year from 1988 through 1997, since 1999, growth
in  GDP  has  exceeded  growth  in  energy
consumption  in  every  year  except  2003.  
Electricity  consumption  has  grown faster  than
primary  or  final  energy  consumption  as  ROK
consumers  as  end-uses  of  electricity  have
increased  faster  than  those  for  other  fuels.
Figure 1: GDP, Primary Energy Use, and Final
Energy Use in the ROK, 1980 - 20094
Figure 2: Trends in Economic and Energy Sector
Activity in the ROK, 1990 - 20095
Figure  3  provides  a  schematic  summary  of
energy supply  and demand in  the  ROK as  of
2007.  Here “exploitation” denotes extraction of
resources,  either  in  the  ROK  or  abroad,  with
“self-exploitation”  meaning  resource  extraction
controlled  by  Korean  firms.   “Introduction  in
Figure 3 means moving resources to the ROK.  In
2009,  96.4  percent  of  energy  resources  were
imported.   Primary  energy,  denoting  energy
forms before they are processed into the fuels,
electricity, and heat used by final consumers, was
42.1 percent crude oil (over 80 percent of it from
the Middle East) and oil products in 2009, with
LNG 13.9 percent,  bituminous coal,  mostly for
power plants, 25.8 percent, and nuclear energy
(as input to 34.1 percent of electricity generation)
13.1  percent.   Anthracite  coal  and  new  and
renewable  energy  comprised  the  remainder  of
less than 5 percent of energy needs.  As shown in
Figure 4, one of the most notable changes in the
last two decades in the ROK energy sector has
been the increase in the use of natural gas, with a
corresponding  decrease  in  the  use  of  oil.  
Industry  still  consumes  the  majority  of  final
energy  use  in  the  ROK,  with  nearly  half  of
industrial energy use being feedstock materials,
mainly the oil product “naptha”, which is used as
an input in the petrochemical industry. 
Among  industries,  as  shown  in  Figure  5,  the
energy-intensive subsectors (iron and steel, non-
metallic  products  including  cement,  and
petrochemicals) have accounted for about three
quarters of energy use and about 30 percent of
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industrial  value  added  over  the  past  two
decades,  though  within  the  energy-intensive
industries there has been a significant shift in the
fract ions  of  energy  used  in  producing
petrochemicals  and  away  from  the  other  two
traditional heavy industries, even as the fractions
of  value  added  by  heavy  industries  have
remained roughly constant.  The largest change
since  1990  has  been  the  vast  increase  in  the
fraction of  industrial  value  added in  the  ROK
economy that has come from the fabricated metal
subsector, including vehicle production, though
the fraction of energy consumed in that subsector
has  risen  only  modestly.   The  fraction  of
industrial  energy  used  and  value  added
produced by the  paper  and publishing,  textile
and apparel, and food and tobacco industries has
declined over time, and though the fraction of
energy used in “other” industries, including, for
example, the electronics industry, has increased
substantially since 1990, its share of value added
has declined.
Figure 3: Flow of Energy Consumption and
Production in the ROK, 20096
Figure 4: Primary Energy Supply by Fuel in the
ROK, 1990 - 20097
Figure 5: Trends in Industrial Energy Use and
Value Added in the ROK, 1990 - 20078
Limited  domestic  energy  resources,  a  growing
manufacturing base in industries highly relevant
to nuclear power development, and the desire to
develop expertise in nuclear technologies, among
other considerations, led the ROK to emphasize
nuclear  power  as  an  energy  supply  security
measure.   21  nuclear  reactors  are  now under
operation,  with ongoing expansion expected to
result  in  28  operating  reactors  as  of  2016.  
Nuclear generation accounted for 34.1 percent of
generation  in  2009,  and  plans  call  for  an
additional 6 reactors to be constructed by 2023. 
By  2010,  the  ROK’s  nuclear  capacity  and
generation  ranked  sixth  among  the  world’s
nations,  its  fraction of  generation produced by
nuclear  power  ranked  fourth  among  the  10
countries  with  the  largest  installed  nuclear
capacity, and the ROK was first by a wide margin
among  the  top  10  nuclear  power  users  when
considering its nuclear capacity per unit of land
area9. The ROK has also been actively promoting
nuclear  technology  exports,  including  a  recent
deal  to  build  reactors  in  the  United  Arab
Emirates.10
The development of the ROK’s climate and green
economy policies
A  combination  of  factors  has  focused  ROK
attention on climate and green economy policies
in recent years.   Over the last century, climate
records  show  that  Korea’s  temperature  has
increased  by  1.5℃,  a  rate  double  the  global
average (0.7℃), and the temperature in Seoul has
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increased by 2.5℃11.  At the same time, the ROK’s
high  energy  consumption  and  near-complete
import  dependence  are  strong  inducements  to
reduce exposure to energy supply security risk
by developing domestic resources.  The ROK also
ranks ninth among the world’s nations in CO₂
emissions from fuel combustion, and first in the
rate at which its GHG emissions grew between
1990 and 2007, more than doubling (increasing
by 103  percent)  over  that  span.12   As  of  2007,
energy  use  accounted  for  by  far  the  largest
fraction of the ROK’s GHG emissions, at almost
85  percent,  with  industrial  sector  non-energy
em i s s i on s ,  i n c l ud ing  em i s s i on s  o f
chlorofluorocarbons  from refrigeration  systems
and  other  sources,  sulfur  hexafluoride,
perfluorocarbons, and other compounds used as
solvents  and cleaning agents  in  the electronics
and  other  industries,  and  CO2  from  cement
production, constituting the next largest source
of emissions in terms of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) at
somewhat  less  than 10  percent.13    Of  energy-
related sources of GHGs, energy transformation
(dominated  by  electricity  generation)  was  the
largest,  at  over  36  percent,  with  industry
accounting  for  32.4  percent.
The  ROK’s  first  major  set  of  climate  change-
related policies was set out in the 1999 draft of
the  “1st  Comprehensive  Counter  Plan  for  the
Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change
(1999~2001)  Act  on  Countermeasures  Against
Global Warming.”  From 1999 through 2007, the
ROK’s  policy  responses  related  to  climate
changes  were  modest  in  scope,  calling  for
emissions  reduction  from  “business  as  usual”
levels that were not particularly aggressive, and
were protective of what was seen as the required
increases  in  energy  use  to  drive  a  growing
economy.   Figure  6  summarizes  the  Basic
National  Plan for Energy as of  2008,  in which
growth in energy use slows from the levels of the
last decade, but overall energy use continues to
climb,  even  with  a  program  of  demand-side
manag emen t  (DSM)  a s s umed  t o  b e
implemented.   In 2008, however, as indicated in
Table 1, a major change occurred in the ROK’s
climate policies, which shifted from what can be
termed  a  “defensive”  position  to  one  that  is
relatively proactive in addressing climate issues. 
Though  the  Lee  Myung-bak  administration
began  its  tenure  with  an  emphasis  on  high
economic growth supported by a massive scale of
civil  engineering development,  its  second year
(2008) saw a sudden turn toward green growth. 
This  policy  change  was  underscored  by
presidential announcements, at G20 meetings in
Japan and Italy in 2008 and 2009, of ROK plans
for significant mid-term GHG emission reduction
targets, followed by the release in August 2009 of
three scenarios for reduction targets produced by
The Presidential Committee on Green Growth. 
Both domestic  and international  considerations
played into the Lee administration’s change in
approach.  In his speech on the 60th anniversary
of  national  independence,  President  Lee
emphasized  green  growth  as  a  “new national
development  paradigm”  to  allow  coming
generations to secure a  reasonable standard of
living, in contrast to the focus in the previous 60
years  on  economic  growth and export  targets,
with  reductions  in  GHG  emissions  as  a  key
indicator of “low carbon green growth.”   At the
same time, the administration sought to upgrade
the ROK’s international image by positioning it
as  an  “early  mover”  in  the  green  economy
transition,  thus  improving  the  ROK’s  “brand
value”  and  positioning  the  ROK as  a  trusted
mediator  between  developing  and  developed
nations,  building on its  status  as  a  (relatively)
newly  industrialized  nation  with  strong
economic  links  to  both  the  developed  and
developing world.14
Figure 6: Targets of the 2007 ROK Basic National
Energy Plan, 2006 - 203015
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Table 1: Evolution of ROK Climate Policies, 1999
- 200816
The nominal  goals  of  recent  ROK climate  and
development policies are to pursue development
of  a  “new economy coupled with ecology,” in
effect creating a virtuous circle between economy
and ecology, leading to a green economy that can
be  a  new  growth  engine .   Despi te  the
development  of  an  array  of  related  policies,
however,  it  is  too  early  to  discern  significant
actual  green  economy  progress  in  the  ROK
resulting  from  green  growth  strategies
promulgated  during  2009  and 2010.   Figure  7
summarizes  the  three  target  scenarios  of  mid-
term (2020) GHG emissions reduction announced
by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth
in  2009.   Each  represents  a  considerable
departure from the pattern of emissions growth
to date and from the BAU (business as usual)
case. The BAU case includes continued reduction
in emissions per unit of economic output that is
overwhelmed  by  increasing  affluence  on  per-
capita  emissions  in  the  ROK,  even  as  the
population  begins  to  decline.  The  most
aggressive of the three target scenarios shown in
Figure 7, with 2020 emissions 30 percent below
the BAU case and 4 percent lower than in 2005,
was  adopted  by  the  ROK  government  in
November  200917  and submitted  to  the  UN in
January of 2010. 
Figure 7: Mid-term Target Scenarios of GHG
Reduction in the ROK18
Following  President  Lee’s  speech  on  the  60th
anniversary of National Independence, (August
15, 2008), all ministries were almost immediately
engaged  in  producing  policy  programs  to
institutionalize  green  growth  strategy,  with
competition between ministries not uncommon. 
In just over 5 months between August 2008 and
January 2009, the following policy programs (and
others)  were  put  forward,  all  focused  on
developing  new  energy  and  industrial
technologies and generating jobs in the field of
green economy:
The  National  Energy  Basic  Plan,  and
Industrial Development Strategy for Green
Energy
The Basic Plan for Comprehensive Action
against Climate Change
The Long-term Master  Plan for  National
R&D on Climate Change
The “Green New Deal”
Comprehensive  Measures  for  R&D
(Research  and  Development)  on  Green
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Technologies
The Vision and Development Strategy for
New Growth Power
The three institutional pillars for Green Growth
in the ROK to date have been the establishment
of the Presidential Commission on Green Growth
in January 2009,  the launching of the National
Strategy and 5 Year Plan for Green Growth in
July of 2009,  and legislation of the Framework
Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth in December
2009, which went into effect on April 14, 2010.  A
“5 Year Green Growth Plan” had as its  vision
elevating  the  ROK  to  the  7th  leading  “Green
Power Country” as of 2020, and to 5th by 2050,
based on three strategies and 10 policy directions:
Strategy 1: climate change adaptation and
energy  independence,  including  effective
reduction of GHG emissions, reduction of
petroleum  use  and  increasing  energy
independence,  and  strengthening  of  the
ROK's  adaptation  capability  against
climate  change  impacts.
Strategy 2: creation of "new growth power"
through  green  technology  development
and its utilization to promote new growth
power, greening industries and promotion
of  green  industries,  deepening  of  the
ROK's  industrial  structure,  and  building
the base of the green economy. 
Strategy  3:  quality-of-life  improvement
and upgrading of national status through
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  “ g r e e n
territory”—meaning  developing  green
spaces and the planting of trees and other
vegetation  throughout  Korea,  in  all
settings  from urban to  rural—and green
transportation  systems,  green  reform  of
the  patterns  of  everyday  l ife,  and
embodiment of the global model nation of
green growth.
To implement these strategies, the ROK was to
spend 107 trillion won (107 billion US dollars) on
green growth projects  between 2009 and 2014,
equivalent to 2% of GDP, with an annual growth
rate of 10.2 percent.   Of the total green growth
investment,  however,  about  20  percent  was
allocated  to  the  “Four  Major  Rivers”  project,
which Korean civil society has criticized as a civil
engineering project that will “kill green rivers.”19 
Strengths and weaknesses of current ROK green
economy policies
Although the  green  energy  policies  developed
during the last few years are a notable departure,
at least nominally, from earlier policies, it is not
clear that the policy shift represents a heartfelt
conversion  to  the  green  economy  concepts  as
defined  above.   Rather,  ROK  green  economy
policies  to  date  have  tended  to  focus  on
establishment  of  techno-bureaucratic  and
hardware-oriented institutions for green growth,
and have resulted in over-politicization of green
growth without building much of a constituency
and concern for green growth among the general
public.   Rather  than  improvements  in  the  
environment,  the last  few years have arguably
seen  a  deterioration  of  the  environmental
performance of the national economy.  The 2010
Environmental  Performance  Index  released  by
the World Economic Forum rated the ROK 94th
among 163 countries, a drop of 43 places since
2008,  and  the  lowest  ranking  among  OECD
member nations.20 
It can be argued that “green growth” as currently
implemented in the ROK is a largely a product of
conceptual  and  ideological  degradation  of
previous meanings of the term.  The “two ecos”
(economy and ecology) have been at the heart of
environmental policy in the ROK since the Kim
Dae-Jung  Government  (1998-2003).   Moreover,
sustainable  development,  a  higher-level
conception of green growth, was instituted as a
national priority policy during the Kim Dae-Jung
and Roh Moo-Hyun Government  (2003-2008).  
Current advocates of green growth in the ROK
misinterpret sustainable development as a West-
centered and ecology-biased concept,  and thus
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not suitable for the ROK.  There has thus been a
process of excluding and discriminating against
traditional  “green”  views,  beginning  with  the
downgrading  of  the  original  Presidential
Commission  on  Sustainable  Development
(PCSD) into a ministerial commission under the
Minster of Environment, with its policy review
position taken over by the current Presidential
Commission  on  Green  Growth  (PCGG).  
Although the PCSD was typical of a governance
body  representing  a  wide  range  of  different
stakeholders,  the  PCGG  is  composed  almost
entirely of pro-governmental techno-bureaucratic
experts  representing  largely  business  interests
and  excluding  green  advocates  from  civil
society.    This  has  resulted,  essentially,  in
representation  in  green-growth  policymaking
limited  to  advocates  of  “market-driven  green
growth.”   When the second term of the PCGG
commenced in July 2010 and took up the theme
of market-driven green growth in its 8th general
meeting,  suggestions  from  the  industrial  and
business  community  were  the  primary  topics
debated,  with  business  and  allied  interests
complaining that green growth policies included
in proposals offered “only green, no growth”, the
reverse  of  the  “only  growth,  no  green”
complaints  of  the  environmental  community
voiced at  an earlier  stage of  the green growth
policy debate.
As a result of this shift in how the green growth
concept  is  put  into  practice,  the  prospects  for
fundamental reform of the ROK’s environmental
performance based on current policies are limited
by the paradox of the ROK’s policies of  green
growth and the green economy.  Essentially, at
present,  these  policies  emphasize  the  economy
first,  and  “green”  second.   The  current  green
growth strategy comprises two key approaches:
1)  “low-carbonization”,  meaning  reduction  of
greenhouse  gas  emiss ions  and  o ther
environmental  pollution  to  accomplish
“defensive  green  growth”,  and  2)  “green
industrialization”,  meaning  generation  of  new
growth,  power,  and  jobs  for  “offensive  green
growth.”   These priorities are reflected in the
chapter structure of the “Framework Act on Low-
Carbon Green Growth,” which read:
Promotion  of  Green  Economy  and1.
Industry
Measures for Climate Change and Energy2.
Construction of Sustainable Territory and3.
Environment
Operationally,  in  green  growth  policy
implementation  priority  is  placed  on  “the
promotion  of  green  economy  and  industry,”
while policies that address climate change and
energy security, sustainable land use, and other
environmental  causes are implemented only to
the extent that they support the priority agenda.  
This reveals the standpoint of the current Korean
government that “the economy (growth) is first,
green  is  second.”   Such  growth,  even  if
considered  “green”,  is  unlikely  to  result  in
significant  environmental  gain  due  to  the
following  chain  of  logic.   First,  the  linkage
between  low-carbon  development  and  green
industrialization is  “green technology.”   Green
technologies,  in  turn  are  eco-eff icient
technologies that offer a relative reduction in the
amount  of  environmental  pollution  per  unit
economic (resource and energy) input, but do not
necessarily imply that the absolute amount of 
environmental  pollution  produced  by  the
economy will actually be lower than in “business
as usual” or some other policy scenario.   This
further implies that the more green growth based
on the principle of eco-efficiency is successfully
pursued,  the  more  environmental  pollution  it
generates.     As  a  result,  the  green  economy
generated by  the  ROK’s  current  green  growth
policies  is  likely  to  end  up  being  neither
sustainable nor secure.
The ROK’s “green growth” energy policy may be
efficient, but by more standard global definitions
of the concept, is rather un-green.  Although the
ROK’s 2020 target of greenhouse gas reduction is
30 percent of the 2020 BAU emissions estimate,
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on closer examination the largest portion of green
energy included in policies to achieve the target
comes from nuclear power, a type of efficient but
un-green energy.  Nuclear power use is planned
to increase from 36 percent of total 2007 power
generation  to  59  percent  in  2030,  in  so  doing
absorbing  the  largest  share  of  the  budget  for
green technology development (35.9 percent in
2009).  
This planned nuclear development, however, is
not without opposition in the ROK.  Within a few
years, the ROK’s existing sites for nuclear power
plants will have all of the reactor units they can
reasonably  accommodate,  and  new plant  sites
will be required.  As of 2010, although almost 90
percent of ROK residents acknowledged the need
for nuclear power, a growing number (over 50
percent)  were  concerned  about  nuclear  safety,
and just over a quarter  (27.5 percent) of survey
respondents found the prospect of new nuclear
plants  in  their  own communities  acceptable.21  
Many experts consider it likely, in the aftermath
of the Fukushima accident, that a similar survey
would  find  less  positive  public  perceptions  of
nuclear power in the ROK. In reality, however,
there was little change in the support for nuclear
power among the  Korean public.   In  a  public
opinion  survey  carried  out  by  WIN-Gallup
International from March 21 to April 10, 2011, the
fraction  of  respondents  favorable  to  nuclear
power  in  Korea  was  64  percent,  down  only
marginally from 65 percent before the Fukushima
accident,  though  the  fraction  of  respondents
describing themselves as unfavorable to nuclear
power increased from 10 percent to 24 percent.
 These polls suggest that in spite of the fact that
one of the two worst nuclear reactors accidents in
history had just occurred in Japan, there is broad
pessimism within the ROK public that there is no
practical alternative to nuclear power for Korea. 
The Korean government has publicly announced,
following the Fukushima accident, that there will
be no change in ROK nuclear power expansion
policy.
Meanwhile,  under  current  government  plans,
renewable energy, a form of green energy, will
continue  to  occupy a  minor  proportion  of  the
total  energy  consumption  over  the  coming  50
decades, rising from 2.7 percent in 2009 to only
6.1  percent  in  2020,  and  only  then  to  a  more
substantial  30  percent  in  2050.   Korea’s  green
growth strategy seems to see renewable energy
technologies as merely a new economic growth
engine,  rather than as energy sources required
for energy and environmental transitions.  The
ROK government has nevertheless announced its
intention  to  implement  renewable  portfolio
standards  starting  in  2012.   Under  these
standards, utility companies would be obliged to
produce a specified fraction of the power needs
of their customers using power generated from
renewable sources.  As a result, the development
of a network of tidal power generation stations is
being  planned,  though  such  stations,  which
involve  erecting  dams  or  barrages  across  the
mouths  of  rivers  or  bays,  can  have  serious
impacts on marine ecosystem, as well as on the
local fishing communities and others that depend
on  those  ecosystems  for  their  livelihood.22  
Concern for energy independence as manifested
in the ROK’s green power policies is not so acute:
the  ROK’s  rate  of  energy  independence  (the
fraction  of  energy  supplies  from  domestic
sources)  excluding nuclear  power  in  2007  was
3.4%, but rose to 16 percent if nuclear power is
considered a domestic resource (though the ROK
imports nuclear fuel and licenses some nuclear
technologies  from other  nations).   There  is  no
clear  target  for  energy independence based on
green  energy.   As  the  ROK’s  export-oriented
economic growth system operates almost entirely
through  the  import  of  cheap  energy  from
overseas,  the  claim  of  a  goal  of  energy
independence by application of current policies
appears rhetorical at best even in the very long
run, and only then with the most aggressive fuel
substitution policies.  This likely lack of progress
on energy supply security implies that without
chang ing  Korea ’ s  e conomic  g rowth
regime—which is sustained by energy efficiency
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(measured as income per unit energy use), which
is the lowest (that is, its energy intensity is the
highest) among OECD countries, in part because
of the concentration of heavy industries in the
ROK—substantially  improving  energy  supply
security  seems  unfeasible  under  current  green
growth policies.
Thus,  the  Korean  government’s  policy  is  to
continue to pursue the expansion of the ROK’s
nuclear power sector even with the Fukushima
accident as a sobering reminder of the risks of
nuclear power.   Currently, Korea has 21 reactors
(18.7  GWe)  in  operation,  7  reactors  under
construction,  4  reactors  under  preparation  for
construction, and 2 additional reactors for which
planning is  complete.   In  2010,  nuclear  power
accounted for 12.2 percent of  national  primary
energy use,  24.8% of  total  installed generation
capacity,  and  34.1  percent  of  total  electricity
generation.  The government plans to expand the
share  of  nuclear  power  to  41  percent  of  total
installed capacity, producing 59 percent of total
electricity  output,  by  2030.   Korea  is  the  only
country  that  is  building  new  reactors  and
planning to further expand its nuclear power use
among the 10 countries with the largest current
nuclear reactor fleets.23  As of 2011, Korea ranks
5th in terms of nuclear installed capacity and in
terms  of  number  of  nuclear  reactors.   Korea’s
nuclear  density  (192.5  kW/km2),  that  is,  its
nuclear installed capacity per unit land area, is
the  second  highest  in  the  world,  just  behind
Belgium (195.7 kW/km2), which hosts 7 reactor
units.   Since  Belgium  has  no  plan  to  build
additional reactors, Korea will become the nation
with  the  highest  nuclear  density  in  the  near
future.   This  high density  of  nuclear  facilities,
coupled  with  a  relatively  high  population
density,  arguably  cannot  but  mean  higher
vulnerability  to  nuclear  incidents  resulting  in
release of radioactive substances, whether caused
by  natural  forces/accidents  or  by  acts  of
aggression.    In  addition,  at  present,  the ROK
government  has  no  firm  plans  for  long-term
spent  fuel  management/disposal,  though
investigation  of  several  potential  paths  (some
with  significant  drawbacks)  is  underway.24  
Despite  these  considerations,  the  government
continues to tout nuclear as the primary power
source for Korea’s future green growth.
A substantial fraction of the ROK’s green growth
program is an outgrowth of a bias toward large
civil  engineering  projects  as  drivers  of
development.   As  such,  the  green  growth
program  features  arguably  “high-carbon”
construction of  so-called “green cities.”  In  this
focus, the green growth strategy stems from the
civil engineering approach that the current ROK
administration,  with  its  emphasis  on  civil
engineering  projects,  is  pursuing.   The  Green
New Deal  program,  part  of  the  green  growth
strategy package, clearly shows this propensity. 
64 percent of the total program budget (some 50
trillion  won,  or  nearly  half  of  the  total  green
growth  budget)  is  to  be  allocated  to  projects
associated with civil engineering work, including
the restructuring of four major rivers, generating
910,000 construction jobs out of the total 950,000
jobs estimated to be created by the Green New
Deal.
The  Four  Major  Rivers  project  has  been
controversial.  The  Lee  Myung-bak government
has  argued that  the  project  is  essential  to  the
green growth movement and to the “Green New
Deal”  because it  offers  significant  employment
potential while restoring four major rivers. Civil
society, however, has resisted the project because
dam construction  and  dredging  are  its  core.  
These activities, many in civil society argue, will
actually  kill  the  four  major  rivers  rather  than
restoring them.25 In addition, it is argued that the
project  actually  offers  little  in  the  way  of
employment opportunities, that the jobs that are
created by the project, mostly short-term jobs in
construction,  do  not  help  to  solve  the  major
unemployment  problem  in  Korea,  namely,
providing  jobs  for  a  highly-educated  younger
generation. In response to surveys, more than 70
percent of Koreans polled expressed objections to
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the project. Though the government announced
that  around  340,000  jobs  will  be  created,
opposing groups argue that only two thousand
long-term jobs will be created.26
Though the ROK is a highly urbanized society,
there is as yet no national target to reduce the
total  energy  consumed  and  greenhouse  gas
produced in  urban areas,  despite  the  fact  that
globally cities consume 75 percent of total final
energy  and  produce  80  percent  of  total  GHG
emissions.   In the ROK, most of the policy efforts
planned  for  the  greening  of  cities  tend  to  be
skewed  toward  constructing  new  green  cities,
which are projected to use 30 percent less energy
than existing  cities,  rather  than  improving  the
energy  efficiency  of  existing  built  areas.   It  is
unclear  from  existing  plans  whether  the
cons iderable  GHG  emiss ions  used  in
constructing new cities have been factored into
the  overall  carbon  budget  for  the  project,  or
whether GHG emissions savings will somehow
be achieved by  retiring  existing  built  areas  as
new cities are built.  As a case in point, the pilot
project to build a low-carbon city now underway
in  the  district  of  Keongpyo  in  Kangneung
(Gangneung),27 is largely a demonstration of new
promising green technology and industry, and is
understood by local residents to be primarily a
new regional development project. 
Typical of the focus on civil  engineering in its
green growth program is the government’s plan
to supply 1 million “green homes” as a flagship
project for the green economy.  The green home
project  is  designed  to  generate  new  housing
technologies  and  industries.   The  approach  is
typical of top-down government-initiated policy
programs,  in  that  it  expands  the  supply  of
environmentally efficient housing by addressing
the “hardware” of the housing stock, with little
effort  to  involve  consumers  in  greening  the
patterns of their everyday life.   By contrast,  in
Ireland,  a  program  also  cal led  “Green
Homes”28 has been initiated by community based
organizations. It focuses on greening family life
as well as community life, for example, through a
“green school” component. 
The ROK’s green growth strategy, if pursued as
currently planned, has a significant probability of
running afoul of Jevon’s Paradox, which states
that as the efficiency with which a resource is
used increases, the use of the resource tends to
increase as well, absent measures (such as higher
taxes) to prevent same, as consumers find they
can afford more of the resource.  Likewise, it is
likely  that  the  more  Korea’s  green  growth  is
pursued, the more energy the Korean economy
will consume, and the more greenhouse gases it
will produce, because the green growth policies
rely heavily on the intriguing principle of eco-
efficiency.  Thus, more investment in eco-efficient
hardware  such  as  passive  housing,  green
industries and green cities will be likely to end
up consuming more total energy and producing
more  total  greenhouse  gas  than  is  presently
produced.  Given current policies, higher energy
demand  will  also  result  in  the  installation  of
more nuclear power,  with its  attendant risk of
nuclear  accidents  as  well  as  production  of
additional spent fuel,  both burdens that would
have to be shouldered by Korean society now
and far into the future.  This implies that Korea’s
future green economy, if shaped by the current
green growth strategy will be neither sustainable
nor secure.
Conclusion: green economy policies in Republic
of Korea
The ROK’s green growth strategy, as currently
formulated,  includes  some  impressive  targets
and demonstration  projects,  but  at  its  heart  it
emphasizes  economic  growth  and  national
industrial  competitiveness  rather  than  being  a
true plan for “greening” of the Korean economy
and society.   As such, current “green” policies
mainly  benefit  existing  large  ROK  industries,
including  the  nuclear  and  construction
industries.   As  a  result,  energy  and  urban
security in Korea’s feeble green economy can be
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secured only insofar as Korea’s current growth
policy regime is either abandoned or reborn as a
genuine environmental  welfare regime.  To do
so, more autonomy, and likely more resources,
should  be  provided  to  the  civil  society
organizations  that  are  best  placed  to  initiate
greening  of  the  everyday  lives  of  Koreans  in
cities and towns at the grassroots levels. 
Such a shift calls for analysis of what additional
inputs nascent local policies will need to succeed,
and  for  a  re-a l ignment  of  the  goals  of
development of the green economy with those of
sustainable  development.   Such a  re-alignment
would,  among  other  goals,  seek  to  change
patterns of energy consumption in existing cities,
pursue a green economy that makes better use of
local  resources,  and  reduce  the  considerable
separation  between  where  energy  (especially
electricity)  is  produced  and  where  it  is
consumed.   Tools  to  accomplish  such  a  re-
alignment would include energy pricing schemes
that  favor  local  electricity  generation  (such  as
attractive  feed-in  tariffs  for  distributed
generation), and promote energy efficiency (such
as rates that increase as a household or business
consumes more).  Efforts should be made to site
power plants closer to consumers so as to more
closely relate the impacts of electricity generation
and transmission  to  those  that  use  the  power
(and reduce the impacts on those that do not). 
Again,  support  for  distributed  generation  and
“smart grid” development can help. 
In  addition,  green  economy  strategies  should
seek  to  improve  the  affordability  of  energy
services  to  low-income  residents, 2 9  and
acknowledge and seek to take advantage of the
fact  that  after  energy  consumption  reaches  a
certain level,  long since exceeded in the ROK,
human  welfare,  as  measured  by  the  Human
Development  Index,  rises  very  little  with
increasing energy use.30 Taking advantage of this
pattern,  the  ROK’s  green  economy  strategy
should emphasize increasing the availability of
energy services to low-income residents, while at
the  same  time  aggressively  improving  energy
efficiency overall so that overall national energy
use  remains  stable  or  even decreases.   In  this
way, green economy benefits can be shared by
all.
Existing green growth policies  tend to use the
types  of  top-down  policy  strategies  that  have
been  traditional  in  Korea.   Achieving  true
sustainable energy and economic development,
founded  on  the  three  goals  of  economic,
environmental,  and  social  sustainability,  will
require  a  different  approach,  one  that  blends
considerations  of  efficiency and energy supply
security  with  low-carbon  and  low-pollution
systems, as well as a commitment to equity and
democratic  participation.    Energy  sector
approaches  such  as  efficiency  improvement,
renewable energy adoption, use of decentralized
energy systems,  and enhanced participation of
residents in energy decisions and the running of
energy  systems  can  be  combined  with  other
approaches  such  as  changes  in  land  use  to
promote more balanced and low-impact use of
the land, enhanced production and use of local
food, and lifestyle transformation.
As part of a sustainable development approach,
expanded  local  energy  use  may  offer  several
advantages including:
Energy  democracy,  providing  local
residents and citizens’ organizations with
opportunities  (and  responsibilities)  to
participate in production and consumption
decisions;
A transition to soft path energy, moving
from centralized supply-oriented systems
to  decentralized,  demand  management-
oriented  systems,  with  expanded  use  of
renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency
improvement,  and  energy  conservation;
Improving  energy  security  through
efficiency  improvement  and  renewable
energy development,  thus  responding to
peak  oil  and  energy  resource  depletion
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problems;
Improving energy justice by making local
communities more responsible for both the
costs  and benefits  of  energy production;
and
Revitalizing  the  local  economy,  in  that
money required for energy production and
consumption  c irculates  within  a
community, rather than going out of the
community (and often, out of the country).
These  approaches  to  achievement  of  a  green
economy by means that  emphasize sustainable
development by design address issues of energy
security, urban security, and climate change.
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